| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3912 |
| DP3912 The Dynamics of Local Employment in France | |
| Thierry Magnac; Pierre-Philippe Combes; Jean-Marc Robin | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We extend a simple version of the citizen candidates model (developed by Osborne-Slivinsky (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to three. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Information Political competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3912 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532884 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Magnac,Pierre-Philippe Combes,Jean-Marc Robin. DP3912 The Dynamics of Local Employment in France. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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