| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3888
|
| DP3888 Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries |
| Jerome Pouyet; Anna Bassanini
|
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-23
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Performance-related pay for teachers is being introduced in many countries, but there is little evaluation to date on the effects of such programmes. This Paper evaluates a particular incentive experiment. The incentive program is a rank-order tournament among teachers of English, Hebrew, and mathematics. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improvements in their students? performance on high-school matriculation exams. Since the schools in the programme were not selected at random, the evaluation is based on comparison groups. Three alternative identification strategies are used to estimate the causal effect of the programme: a natural experiment stemming from measurement error in the assignment variable, a regression discontinuity method, and propensity score matching. The results of all three methods tell a consistent story: teachers? monetary performance incentives have a significant effect on students? achievements in English and math. No spillover effect on untreated subjects is evident and the general equilibrium impact of the programme is positive as well. The programme is also more cost-effective than alternative forms of intervention such as extra instruction time and is as effective as cash bonuses for students. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
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| 关键词 | Teachers incentives
Students achievement
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3888
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532875
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jerome Pouyet,Anna Bassanini. DP3888 Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries. 2003.
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