| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3535 |
| DP3535 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? | |
| Kevin W S Roberts; Leonardo Felli | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of buyer power on the supplier's incentives and social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in the policy debate on buyer power, we find that the exercise of buyer power -even though reducing supplier's profits- may often increase a supplier's incentive to undertake welfare enhancing activities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Buyer power Retailing Mergers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3535 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532544 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kevin W S Roberts,Leonardo Felli. DP3535 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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