G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3827
DP3827 The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from Randomized Trials
Josh Angrist; Victor Lavy
发表日期2002-03-23
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要The merit of having international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. While the privately optimal level of bank capital decreases with regulatory forbearance (they are strategic substitutes), the socially optimal level of bank capital increases with regulatory forbearance (they are strategic complements). Hence, in optimal regulatory design, the level of minimum bank capital requirement increases with the forbearance in central bank closure policy. The lack of such linkage leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank?s forbearance to its alignment with domestic bankowners, it is shown that in equilibrium a regression towards the worst closure policy may result: the central banks of initially less forbearing economies have to adopt greater forbearance as well.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bank regulation Capital adequacy Closure policy Risk-shifting Financial integration International spillovers
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3827
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532317
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Josh Angrist,Victor Lavy. DP3827 The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from Randomized Trials. 2002.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Josh Angrist]的文章
[Victor Lavy]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Josh Angrist]的文章
[Victor Lavy]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Josh Angrist]的文章
[Victor Lavy]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。