| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2983
|
| DP2983 A Macroeconomic Experiment in Mass Immigration |
| Eran Yashiv; Zvi Hercowitz
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-29
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Economic theory points to five parties active in disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in take-overs, non-executive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This Paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in the discipline of management. We find that, in the UK, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little discipline and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by non-executive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in take-overs but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the US, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but non-executive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Corporate governance
Control
Restructuring
Board turnover
Regulation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2983
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532014
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Eran Yashiv,Zvi Hercowitz. DP2983 A Macroeconomic Experiment in Mass Immigration. 2001.
|
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