| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2662
|
| DP2662 Regional Risksharing and Redistribution in the German Federation |
| Jurgen von Hagen; Ralf Hepp
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-01-30
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines the size, the composition and the scope of unions. Our model implies that the equilibrium size of the union is inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity between countries and to the spectrum of common policies. Hence, there is a trade-off between enlargement and deepening of coordination: a union involved in too many collateral activities will be favoured by few countries, while a union which focuses on a core of activities will be favoured by many countries. The political equilibrium implies a bias toward excessive centralization and small size of the union, however. This bias can be corrected if there is a constitutional commitment of the union to centralize only certain policies. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Political economy
Federalism
Subsidarity
European union
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2662
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531723
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jurgen von Hagen,Ralf Hepp. DP2662 Regional Risksharing and Redistribution in the German Federation. 2001.
|
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