| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2349 |
| DP2349 Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution | |
| Michele Polo; Massimo Motta | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro-effects concerning the behaviour of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labour supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial incentives Sanctions Unemployment benefits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2349 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531439 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Polo,Massimo Motta. DP2349 Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution. 2000. |
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