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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP2094 |
DP2094 The Weightless Economy in Economic Development | |
Danny Quah | |
发表日期 | 1999-03-29 |
出版年 | 1999 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When we endogenize the number of downstream firms, we find that each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss how allowing for contracts that involve both fees and per-unit payments dramatically alters the strategic incentives. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Intrabrand competition Royalties Strategic contracting Two-part tariffs |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2094 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531212 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Danny Quah. DP2094 The Weightless Economy in Economic Development. 1999. |
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