| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1773 |
| DP1773 The Real Exchange Rate in Transition Economies | |
| Charles Wyplosz; Clemens Grafe | |
| 发表日期 | 1997-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation of funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract is a time-varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk-sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option. The option itself is based on the control of the funds. The dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficiently early end to the project. A positive liquidation explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities. Finally, relationship financing, including monitoring and the occasional replacement of management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Dynamic financial constraints Optimal stopping Relationship finance Security design Share contracts Venture financing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1773 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530914 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles Wyplosz,Clemens Grafe. DP1773 The Real Exchange Rate in Transition Economies. 1997. |
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