| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP713
|
| DP713 Why Do Market Shares Matter?: An Information-Based Theory |
| Xavier Vives; Ramon Caminal
|
| 发表日期 | 1992-10-03
|
| 出版年 | 1992
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyse the informational content of market shares and prices in a dynamic duopoly model in which consumers have heterogenous information on the quality differential (q) of two goods. It is shown that when firms are poorly informed about q, and therefore the ability of prices to reveal information is limited, consumers rationally believe that a firm with a high market share is likely to produce a high-quality good. As a result, firms try to signal-jam the inferences of consumers and compete for market shares beyond the level explained by short-run profit maximization. The consequence is that the market is more competitive in the first stages of the game and approaches the benchmark one-shot full information equilibrium prices as consumers and firms learn about q. Further, it is found that consumers display herd behaviour with the consequence that they learn q slowly, slowing down, in turn, the rate of convergence of prices to their benchmark levels. When firms are informed about q, and prices have the potential to signal quality, multiple equilibria may exist, but there is always one equilibrium in which market shares are a positive signal of quality. |
| 关键词 | Consumer learning
Herd behaviour
Market share
Oligopoly
Quality signals
Signal-jamming
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp713
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529872
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Xavier Vives,Ramon Caminal. DP713 Why Do Market Shares Matter?: An Information-Based Theory. 1992.
|
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