| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP261 |
| DP261 Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Market for Loans: Credit Restriction Versus Credit Rationing | |
| Tim Besley; Anindya Banerjee | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model of equilibrium in the market for loans. It focuses on the effects on equilibrium of (i) differences in the liability of the lender and the borrower for losses; and (ii) differences in the information available to the lender. We examine the different types of imperfection in the credit market which arise as a consequence of these differences and draw a distinction between outcomes where credit is rationed (the borrower would wish to borrow more at some interest rate) and those where credit is restricted (the borrower is able to borrow less than he would be able to were some imperfection removed). We demonstrate unambiguous propositions about credit restriction, but in the model we examine, this need not necessarily be accompanied by credit rationing. |
| 关键词 | Credit markets Credit rationing Liability Loans Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp261 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529420 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tim Besley,Anindya Banerjee. DP261 Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Market for Loans: Credit Restriction Versus Credit Rationing. 1988. |
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