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• While the cost to Russia of U.S. diplomatic efforts buttressed by the prospect of third-party sanctions is difficult to determine with precision, there is no question that the "chilling effect" has resulted in Russia losing arms sales.
• Countries with significant portions of their military arsenal composed of Soviet Union and Russian weapons systems, such as Vietnam and India, face formidable challenges in quick diversification away from Russian systems; even countries eager to diversify away from Russian systems may find it difficult and costly to do in the short run.
• Countries that do not have legacy arsenals composed of Soviet and Russian systems may be more amenable to eschewing Russian arms export offers if suitable, competitively priced, and politically desirable alternatives are available.
• Diplomacy paired with the prospect of sanctions will likely be most effective when it acknowledges the legacy of Russian arms exports to certain countries; the desire to assert independence from the influence of Russia and/or the United States; and the availability of suitable, competitively priced alternatives to meet buyers' security needs.

In this report, the authors examine Russian arms exports and the impact of sanctions designed to discourage third country purchases and raise the cost of future Russian malign interference in other nation-states. The authors draw from publicly available information compiled in a database to illustrate when U.S. diplomatic engagement or the prospect of U.S. sanctions has led third countries to reconsider importing Russian weapons. The data set used for this report contains 65 cases in 33 countries of Russian arms export negotiations and sales, beginning in July 2017 and ending in May 2021; these cases illustrate that, as U.S. officials acknowledge, the monetary value of lost Russian arms sales due to U.S. diplomatic efforts buttressed by the prospect of third-party sanctions is difficult to determine with precision.

However, there are several examples of countries that clearly entertained purchasing Russian weapons and then, because of the chilling effect of possible sanctions, demurred and opted not to do so. Analysis of these cases indicates that diplomatic outreach to arms-buying countries will likely be most effective when it acknowledges the legacy of Russian arms exports; the desire to assert independence from Russia and/or the United States; and the availability of suitable, competitively priced alternatives to meet buyers' security needs. To better meet the objectives of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the United States must ensure that foreign officials and publics receive a narrative focused mainly on the harm caused by Russian malign behavior rather than the threat of U.S. sanctions.

• Chapter One

  Policy on Russian Arms Exporters, Sanctions, and Malign Interference in Other States

• Chapter Two

  Highlighting Russian Malign Interference by Curtailing Russian Arms Exports: Turkey and India

• Chapter Three

  Other States Meet Security Needs and Comply with CAATSA Objectives: Indonesia, Morocco, and Nigeria

• Chapter Four

  Arms-Importing States Have Adapted to U.S. and Allied Sanctions

• Chapter Five

  Conclusions and Recommendations