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Increasing operational unpredictability is possible but likely costly, and may have negative side effects

• Increasing U.S. operational unpredictability is only one of many approaches to enhancing extended deterrence.
• Limited information on Russian and Chinese intelligence, military planning, and decisionmaking processes makes it difficult to assess the potential effects of U.S. attempts to be operationally unpredictable.
• The available information suggests that increasing Russian and Chinese perceptions of U.S. operational unpredictability may be possible, but also costly.
• The most promising way to increase U.S. operational unpredictability is to publicize new U.S. capabilities and demonstrate that they give the United States multiple options for achieving its key objectives.
• This approach may enhance extended deterrence if each U.S. way of fighting requires different and costly adversary counters.
• This approach may have negative side effects, such as reducing U.S. readiness and increasing China's and Russia's threat perceptions.

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy instructed the U.S. military to become more operationally unpredictable and suggested that doing so would help the United States deter attacks on U.S. partners. The authors of this report propose a definition of U.S. operational unpredictability—adversary uncertainty about how the United States would fight; develop four potential approaches for increasing U.S. operational unpredictability and deterring attacks on U.S. allies and partners; and assess how the four approaches could affect U.S. relations with Russia and China. They also examine two Cold War–era cases in which the United States sought to be more operationally unpredictable.

The authors find that increasing adversaries' perceptions of U.S. operational unpredictability may be possible if the United States has detailed information about their operational analysis and decisionmaking processes. The most promising way to increase U.S. operational unpredictability is to publicize new U.S. capabilities and demonstrate that they give the United States multiple options for achieving its key objectives. However, increasing U.S. operational unpredictability may be costly and, in some cases, involve negative side effects (e.g., reducing U.S. military effectiveness and increasing China's and Russia's threat perceptions). The authors recommend weighing the potential costs and effectiveness of these approaches against more traditional approaches to deterring U.S. adversaries.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Key Concepts and Methodology for Generating Options for Enhancing U.S. Operational Unpredictability

• Chapter Three

  Approach 1: Create Irregular Deployment Patterns

• Chapter Four

  Approach 2: Reveal or Demonstrate New Capabilities

• Chapter Five

  Approach 3: Bluff About U.S. Ability to Conduct Multiple COAs

• Chapter Six

  Approach 4: Repeatedly Reveal Covert Capabilities

• Chapter Seven

  Findings and Recommendations

• Appendix A

  Test of Approach 2: Autumn Forge 1975

• Appendix B

  Test of Approach 2: Ocean Venture 81