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• The do-nothing option is very risky: NATO's current deterrent in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable.
• Improvements to conventional forces have the highest priority; they could also enhance the value of some nuclear options. Some of these improvements are underway.
• Practiced options for extremely fast response without much strategic warning are important because Russia might otherwise find ways, using deception, to accomplish a short-warning fait accompli.
• Despite Russia's regional escalation dominance, the modernized nuclear options might be valuable in certain circumstances of crisis or conflict if Russian leaders have not already anticipated and discounted the significance of NATO's nuclear use (whether a first use or in response to Russian first use).
• Given the limited military value for modernized NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons, some may question the priority of pursuing such modernization. However, modernized nuclear options would reduce Russian asymmetries in theater-nuclear matters, which can be significant to public and international perceptions. Also, reducing nonstrategic nuclear weapon asymmetries might cause NATO allies to feel more assured of the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and might improve U.S. leverage in possible negotiations about nonstrategic nuclear weapons (the United States has very little leverage now). Finally, modernized nuclear options might be necessary for dealing with security challenges other than Russia.

Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Selective Review of Deterrence Theory

• Chapter Three

  Developments Since the Cold War

• Chapter Four

  Limited Nuclear Options for NATO Consideration

• Chapter Five

  Selected Methods for Evaluating Deterrence Options

• Chapter Six

  Wargaming the Use of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During an Invasion of the Baltic States

• Chapter Seven

  Conclusions

• Appendix A

  A Deterrence Model for Exploring Issues Speculatively

• Appendix B

  Format for Wargaming a Conflict in the Baltic States

• Appendix C

  Conventional Force Cost Estimates

• Appendix D

  Tactical Nuclear Force Cost Estimates