全球智库信息集成服务系统

• The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) continues to use a Two Regional Wars standard for force planning, although this standard now bears little relationship to what the administration and the nation expect U.S. armed forces to be prepared to do.
• Important national interests today are being challenged by two major powers — Russia and China — that pose operational and strategic challenges that far outstrip those posed by the regional adversaries that animate DoD's current force planning construct (FPC).
• With its growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, North Korea today presents threats for which U.S. and allied forces lack satisfactory answers.
• Although the United States and its allies and partners have made considerable headway in blunting the threat posed by al Qa'ida and its affiliates, U.S. forces must expect to be engaged in the struggle with Salafist-jihadi groups, such as ISIS, for many years to come.
• Addressing the challenges posed by the most-capable adversaries generally calls not for a larger U.S. force but rather for a force equipped with appropriate modern weapons and support assets that is also postured for responsive and resilient operations in theaters of potential conflict.

This report evaluates the capabilities of current and programmed U.S. forces to meet the demands of conflicts that could arise involving any of five potential adversaries: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Salafist-jihadi groups worldwide. The report finds that U.S. forces today are larger than necessary to fight a single major war, are failing to keep pace with the modernizing forces of great power adversaries, are poorly postured to meet key challenges in Europe and East Asia, and are insufficiently trained and ready to get the most operational utility from many of its active component units. The report recommends a host of enhancements to the capabilities and posture of U.S. forces and offers three alternative force planning constructs to help ensure that defense resources are, in the future, applied to the highest-priority needs.

• Chapter One

  The Need for a New Approach to Force Planning

• Chapter Two

  China: Ensuring Access to the Air and Sea Commons and Sustaining Capabilities for Effective Power Projection Operations

• Chapter Three

  Responding to Russia's Remilitarization of Geopolitics in Europe

• Chapter Four

  Countering a Nuclear-Armed North Korea

• Chapter Five

  Countering Iranian Aggressiveness and Maintaining Balance in the Persian Gulf Region

• Chapter Six

  Combating Salafist-Jihadi Groups: The Roles Played by U.S. SOF

• Chapter Seven

  Alternative Force Planning Constructs and Associated Forces

• Appendix A

  The Third Offset and the Future of DoD's R&D Investment Portfolio

• Appendix B

  On the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Posture

• Appendix C

  Estimating the Costs of Alternative Future Forces: Assumptions and Approach

• Appendix D

  Sizing Force Elements for Alternative Force Planning Constructs