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Armies Must Be Assisted with an Eye Toward Enhancing Legitimacy

• The extent to which a client military contributes to nation-building by enhancing state legitimacy might be more important to U.S. SFA goals than its military capabilities.
• As indicators of SFA success, national cohesion and identity can matter as much, if not more, than military capability.

The Case Studies Make Clear That Critical to the Success of a Fragile or Beleaguered State Is the Extent to Which Its Leaders Are Committed Nation Builders

• The United States is unlikely to make much headway unless the host-nation's own government is itself engaged in a comprehensive nation-building project, which must include promoting a specific national identity that supports its legitimacy.
• The United States can influence and strengthen another country's nation-building efforts.

There Is a Range in the Extent to Which Host-Nation Leaders Have Engaged in Nation-Building Projects

• Some have clear ideas about how to proceed and are actively working toward nation building goals but could benefit from assistance.
• Other nations lack any vision or program and will have to be convinced of their importance.
• The United States should recognize the limits of what SFA can do especially if it determines the host nations to be inattentive to nation-building.

This report proposes an alternative approach to Security Force Assistance (SFA) derived from an interpretation of nation-building and legitimacy formation grounded in history; it highlights the importance of ideas, identities, and ideology and argues that SFA efforts often err by focusing too much on force structure, capabilities, and readiness, while not sufficiently considering the extent to which a force's development complements the larger nation-building project and the formation of appropriate ideas, identities, and ideologies within the force. The report uses six case studies (South Korea, South Vietnam, Iraq, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria) to analyze the relationship between building armies and building nations as well as potential U.S. contributions.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  The Army of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Advisory Mission

• Chapter Three

  The Army of the Republic of Vietnam

• Chapter Four

  The Iraqi Army

• Chapter Five

  The Ghanaian Army

• Chapter Six

  The Malian Army

• Chapter Seven

  The Nigerian Army

• Chapter Eight

  Conclusion