全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	工作论文
	The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement
	Jun Zhou
发表日期	2016-02-29
出版年	2016
语种	英语
概述	This paper shows that antitrust investigation in a market increases leniency applications in related markets. The authors used a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the EC between 1996 and 2014.
摘要	0.5 Mb Download PDF Highlights The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of
主题	Innovation & Competition Policy
关键词	cartels
URL	https://bruegel.org/2016/02/the-dynamics-of-leniency-application-and-the-knock-on-effect-of-cartel-enforcement/
来源智库	Bruegel (Belgium)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/429543
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jun Zhou. The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement. 2016.

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13042-000001.png（37KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
WP-2016_02-1.pdf（450KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览