| 摘要 | On January 26, Barack Obama will become the first U.S. president to preside as chief guest at India’s 65th Republic Day anniversary – an invitation usually extended to India’s closest diplomatic allies. But what is more important is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s shift away from India’s outdated foreign policy of “nonalignment” toward a sharper strategic focus. Modi’s move signals that India is no longer afraid to show a more strategic U.S.-India partnership is in India’s national interest. Making for strong symbolism, Obama will witness the celebration of India’s democratic constitution and military might, and likely sign on to a renewal of a ten-year pact to expand defense and security ties.
Signed in 2005, the expiring defense agreement committed to expanding defense trade, technology transfers, coproduction, and collaboration on counterterrorism, security and stability. Today, India conducts more joint military exercises with the United States than with any other country; defense sales shot up from zero in 2008 to $9 billion last year resulting in the United States displacing Russia as India’s biggest supplier.
The U.S.-India defense relationship started on a tough footing even after the end of the 1998 U.S.-imposed nuclear test sanctions on India. India harks back to U.S. failures to approve licenses for military spare parts – for instance, the U.S. decision to halt the engine supply for India’s Shivalik-class stealth warships in 2009 – and remains reluctant to trust America’s reliability in times of need. Aiming to fix that, the United States removed restrictions on technology sharing with India to deepen trust and cooperation. However, Indian firms went for the lowest bidder and removed the U.S.-made F-16 and FA-18 jets from their combat aircraft competition in 2011, reducing geostrategic leverage with the United States just when it offered a chance to mend ties.
So how can this time be different? The 2005 agreement lacked strategic focus and failed to transform the relationship from a simple arms trade into a seamless, committed, partnership. But, unlike India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Modi seems game to put India’s national interest and shared interests with the United States ahead of past grievances. The invitation to Obama is a case in point. In the face of rising security threats – Chinese incursions into Indian territory, Pakistan’s sporadic border firing along the Line of Control, the expansion of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – Modi aims to bolster India’s military might. The two countries are bound together by common interests like containing China’s growing power, post-U.S. withdrawal coordination in Afghanistan, and the need for maritime security in Asia. Modi must remember that a deeper defense relationship can bring long-term mutual gain. By doing more business with India, the United States can help marry Modi’s priorities of military modernization and fixing India’s sclerotic defense industry. In turn, India can provide more business to American defense companies and prove to be America’s strategic, democratic, counterweight in Asia.
Here are three areas that Modi should focus on to deepen the U.S.-India defense relationship from the Indian side.
The full text of this article is available on ForeignPolicy.com.
Hemal Shah is a research associate for India studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. She tweets @hemalshah_7. |
