| 来源类型 | Book |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| China’s Global Presence | |
| David M. Lampton; Catherine H. Keyser | |
| 发表日期 | 1988 |
| 出版者 | AEI Press |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Read the full PDF. Buy the book. Preface This volume, comprising eight provocative chapters by leading analysts of China, assesses the economic and security implications of the modernization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan as we approach the twenty-first century. The first drafts of this book’s chapters were presented at two March 1987 conferences that the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) jointly convened in Singapore with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and in Seoul, Korea, with the Ilhae Institute. The views expressed and the vocabulary used reflect those of each author, not necessarily those of the sponsoring institutions or the other contributors to this volume. The revised chapters (and accompanying discussion) reflect the probing interchanges that occurred in Asia. AEI would like to express its gratitude to the director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Dr. K. S. Sandhu, and to the president of the Ilhae Institute, Dr. Kim Kihwan. Both institutes were full intellectual partners in this endeavor, and this volume benefited greatly from the collaboration and exchange. In Singapore, the superb staff led by Y. L. Lee, executive secretary, was most responsive. In Seoul, AEI would like to thank Mr. Taehyun Ha, coordinator, international programs, for his consideration and excellent arrangements. Individually, the chapters address the following topics: the prospects for reform in the PRC amid the politics of succession; economic and political change on the island of Taiwan; the potential for Sino-American trade and economic relations; the growth outlook for the PRC’s economy; the likely configurations and global significance of China’s electronics and aircraft industries in the next dozen years; China’s strategic role as a middle-range nuclear power; and the implications of the growth of the PRC’s power for Asia and the Pacific. Taken as a whole, the research presented in this volume leads to several important conclusions. First, Taiwan’s remarkable record of growth, though perhaps it will be somewhat slower in the future than in the past, will continue. The prospects for increased internationalization of the island’s economy are good, and the political system will likely be able to maintain reasonable stability as the polity moves into the post–Chiang Ching-kuo era. U.S. trade policies that put too much pressure on Taiwan’s economy and polity would not serve these important objectives. It is essential that the pluralization of Taiwan’s polity not exacerbate secessionist tendencies. Were this to occur, the PRC might undertake military or other initiatives that would prove contrary to the interests of the people on Taiwan and put the American polity in a quandary, with unpredictable consequences for all three. Second, in the PRC, economic and political reform are somewhat precarious, as the Beijing elite seeks to deal with the dislocations and disequilibriums caused by previous reform efforts, all the while trying to ensure a smooth transition to the post-Deng Xiaoping era. While there is ample reason for caution in predictions about the future, recent reform efforts have improved Chinese living standards considerably, although there is a very long way to go: it is these improvements, and the widespread desire among members of the elite and citizenry alike to avoid social instability, that make continuation of economic reform policies probable. Third, with respect to Sino-American trade, the prospects for significant future expansion are good, although total commerce between China and the United States will still remain a modest component of total U.S. trade in the year 2000. To ensure that American business shares in the growth of the China market and the significant anticipated expansion of the Chinese economy, Washington needs to avoid protectionist measures that would reduce the PRC’s ability to earn the hard currency needed to import American goods. In addition, technology transfer procedures need to be further simplified, and consideration should be given to financing arrangements that would help make American exports more attractive to China; more active Export-Import Bank activity would be helpful, for example. For its part, Beijing needs to make further and effective efforts to improve the investment climate, open the domestic market, and reduce the excessive costs of doing business in the PRC. Fourth, in the areas of advanced electronics and aircraft, China’s huge domestic market ensures its own enterprises of large internal sales. By the year 2000, however, the PRC is unlikely to become a major solo producer of advanced systems that are competitive on the global market. The most feasible way for China to participate in international high technology manufacturing and trade is to develop cooperative arrangements with foreign firms and raise the domestic technological and managerial level gradually. Beijing’s political and economic leaders should recognize that most complex items are no longer single-country products. China must find and nurture its niche in the international division of labor. Fifth, turning to China as a global military actor, the expansion of the PRC’s nuclear forces will likely exceed current publicly available projections, although Beijing’s strategic nuclear forces will remain much behind the superpower arsenals, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Of increasing concern to Chinese leaders will be how to ensure a retaliatory capability as the superpowers forge ahead with their respective strategic defense initiatives. This worry, and the financial and opportunity costs of trying to compete in a world in which strategic defense plays an increasing role, should give China’s leadership growing incentives to play a role in arms control. If China seeks security through continued expansion of its nuclear forces, this could well have consequences for American efforts to halt proliferation, particularly in Asia. Nonetheless, China’s exercise of conventional and nuclear muscle will probably be quite circumspect because of the priority that Beijing attaches to internal economic objectives. This latter point brings us back to reform and domestic politics in China. Whether the issue be stability in the Taiwan Strait, security on the Korean Peninsula, Sino-American trade, cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges, or arms control and strategic stability, the keys to managing them will be the maintenance of internal order in China and the continued presence in Beijing of leaders who believe that they have a stake in a China with a multiplicity of economic, political, and cultural ties, in all directions. A truly independent foreign policy in which economic and cultural ties dominate, as this volume indicates, would best serve American interests and the interests of a developing China. David M. Lampton |
| 主题 | Asia |
| 标签 | AEI Archive ; AEI Press ; China ; China-Taiwan relations ; Chinese economy ; Taiwan |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/chinas-global-presence/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/208074 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David M. Lampton,Catherine H. Keyser. China’s Global Presence. 1988. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
