| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| A proposal to enhance competition and reform bidding in the Medicare Advantage Program | |
| Joseph Antos; Steven M. Lieberman; Loren Adler; Erin Trish; John Bertko; Paul B. Ginsburg | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Medicare beneficiaries have the option of receiving health coverage either through “traditional” Medicare, in which the government directly pays providers for all covered services, or by enrolling in a private Medicare Advantage (MA) health plan. If beneficiaries opt for the latter, Medicare pays the plans a fixed monthly amount for each enrolled member, and MA plans assume full financial responsibility for providing all Medicare-covered benefits to their enrollees. Thirty-three percent of all Medicare beneficiaries now enroll in MA plans. However, the current structure of the competitive bidding process for MA plans is plagued by a poor bidding structure, which results in inefficiently high plan bids, a complex choice environment for consumers, and uneven subsidization of MA enrollees based on location. In “A proposal to enhance competition and reform bidding in the Medicare Advantage Program” (PDF), Steven M. Lieberman, Loren Adler, Erin Trish, Joseph Antos, John Bertko, and Paul B. Ginsburg propose two key changes to the MA bidding process to lower prices and enhance choice for consumers. The authors propose revising the current contracting process to focus on promoting price competition, as well as standardizing the benefits offered under MA plans to improve comparison shopping and provide a common basis for plan bids. “As our analysis illustrates, converting Medicare Advantage to a competitive bidding system offers an opportunity to make the program more efficient and produce significant federal budgetary savings without shifting costs to beneficiaries. Greater program efficiency should be achievable by incentivizing MAOs to compete on price for a standardized product, rather than competing primarily on benefit generosity, as is largely the case today.” The authors estimate their proposal would save the federal government $10 billion annually, and reduce Medicare Part B premiums across both MA and traditional Medicare beneficiaries by approximately 2 percent a year. Read the full paper here. |
| 主题 | Health Care |
| 标签 | Medicare |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-proposal-to-enhance-competition-and-reform-bidding-in-the-medicare-advantage-program/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/206545 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph Antos,Steven M. Lieberman,Loren Adler,et al. A proposal to enhance competition and reform bidding in the Medicare Advantage Program. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| ma-bidding-paper.pdf（1158KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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