| 摘要 | Key Points
Aviation units from all branches of the military do not have the people, training, or equipment they need to execute the National Defense Strategy.
As the military shifts its focus to strategic competition with Russia and China and trains for the prospect of large-scale warfare, it will have to plan for ongoing readiness shortfalls.
Even as readiness rates improve, the Armed Forces will continue to pay for running on “the ragged edge of readiness” and for years of undertraining aviators and those who support them.
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Introduction
Appropriately subtitled “Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” the 2018 National Defense Strategy directed the Department of Defense to prepare for “long-term strategic competition” with revisionist powers Russia and China.1 For the purposes of training and readiness generation, the strategy codifies the military’s shift from preparing for lower-intensity counterinsurgency operations to preparing for a large-scale conflict with a modern, capable enemy.2 The military has its work cut out for it; high-end warfare demands a higher level of readiness than the services have reached in many years, and the cost of failure in such a conflict could dwarf that of recent wars.
Leaders of each service reported in late 2017 and early 2018 that they have, in the words of Vice Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General Stephen Wilson, “arrested the readiness decline.”3 Supported by an incremental funding increase in 2017, the military added personnel, increased training hours, and funded more maintenance work, allowing it to begin addressing long-standing readiness shortfalls.
Aviation units in particular reaped the benefits of more resources. Pilots and aviators spent more time in the cockpit than they had in previous years. The Air Force received funding to recruit and train more pilots and maintainers. Troops were able to spend more time at home between deployments. And maintainers made progress in clearing the backlog of maintenance requests.
However, progress should not be confused with success. The services still face shortfalls in manpower, available aircraft, training opportunities, maintenance time, and spare parts. Moreover, the gains of the past year will be fleeting if they are not sustained. The cumulative damage done to military readiness will continue to haunt aviation forces for years to come. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Moran explained, once even a year’s worth of training and experience is lost, “it’s very difficult to buy it back.”4
Indeed, with the National Defense Strategy’s directive in mind, it is useful to consider the long-term, qualitative effects of past readiness shortfalls. As the military focuses on strategic competition and trains for the prospect of large-scale warfare, it will have to account for the repercussions of ongoing readiness shortfalls.
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