| 摘要 | Key Points
The conflict in Ukraine remains an interstate war, though its relatively stable front line is beset by recurrent cycles of escalation.
Russia’s overarching objective remains keeping Ukraine in its privileged sphere of influence, denying the country opportunities to join either NATO or the European Union.
Given the interests at stake, Russian leadership is unlikely to let the present situation drift, with its attendant political and economic costs, without taking some action to alter the present state of affairs.
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Introduction
The conflict in Ukraine remains an unsettled interstate war, beset by recurrent cycles of escalation. Sporadic fighting along the line of control is punctuated by skirmishes and large-scale artillery duels. A moribund peace process, the Minsk ceasefire agreement, exists largely on paper and has failed to deliver a meaningful settlement. Back channels remain the principal means of communication among Moscow, Kyiv, and respective European capitals. Meanwhile the Normandy format (Russia, Germany, France, and Ukraine) has become a high-level political theater, where the presidents meet to negotiate the implementation of a nonexistent ceasefire. The Minsk agreement appears to have been dead on arrival when it was first signed in February 2015. Three years of war have exacted a substantial economic and human toll on both sides, particularly the residents of the conflict zone, with no discernible path toward resolution.
This paper will examine three potential scenarios for conflict escalation and the various ways in which Moscow may pursue its interests in Ukraine. While they are hypothetical in nature, the contingencies envisioned are grounded in the realities of the conflict, its present trajectory, and Russia’s strategy, doctrine, and force posture. The options considered include a political warfare campaign against Ukraine, co-optation and subversion of internal actors, and a significantly more escalatory approach centered on inflicting another military defeat. Among the options explored, the most probable and preferable for Moscow, given Russia’s strategic predilections, is a low-cost effort based on subversion, information warfare, and the instigation of protests.
A less likely though potentially desirable path for Moscow would be state-sponsored insurgency, directed terrorism, and destabilization. A third low-probability development is a sequence of events that could result in a larger military showdown, one that is intentionally provoked for the sake of changing a political regime in Kyiv. The following sections explore these options in depth and provide a strategic and military assessment of the conflict as it stands today.
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