| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10018-019-00236-8 |
| Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator. | |
| Palokangas T | |
| 发表日期 | 2019 |
| 出处 | Environmental Economics and Policy Studies |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the use of energy in production generates welfare-harming emissions, there is a regulator that sets industry-specific emission permits and the industries influence the regulator by paying political contributions. I show that policy with nontraded emission permits establishes aggregate production efficiency. Emission permit trading hampers efficiency and welfare by increasing the use of emitting inputs in dirty and decreasing that in clean industries. |
| 主题 | Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA) |
| 关键词 | Emission caps, Emission permit trading, Command-and-control instruments, Common agency games |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15697/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131619 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Palokangas T. Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator.. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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