| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| Ostrom game theory applied to financial services bonuses and policy improvements. | |
| Walsh A; Brady M; Magnuszewski P | |
| 发表日期 | 2018 |
| 出处 | The Journal of Financial Perspectives 5 (1): 6-20. |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Elinor Ostrom’s work on sustaining common-pool resources (CPRs) has had a profound impact on the management of natural resources. It has had very little impact on the regulation of the financial services industry. The purpose of this article, which focuses in particular on bonus payments, is to argue that this neglect may result in a number of tools available to regulators, industry and the public being underexploited. Coercively-powered, external rule-setting and monitoring authorities appear to have insufficient ability on their own to sustain a natural resource system. |
| 主题 | Risk & ; Resilience (RISK) ; Water (WAT) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15175/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131470 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Walsh A,Brady M,Magnuszewski P. Ostrom game theory applied to financial services bonuses and policy improvements.. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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