| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 |
| Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. | |
| Hilbe C; Traulsen A; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2015 |
| 出处 | Games and Economic Behavior 92: 41-52 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| 关键词 | repeated games zero-determinant strategies cooperation reciprocity extortion |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11434/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/130157 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hilbe C,Traulsen A,Sigmund K. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 1-s2.0-S089982561500（589KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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