| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1073/pnas.0808450106 |
| Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games. | |
| Traulsen A; Hauert C; De Silva H; Nowak MA; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (3): 709-712 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the available set of strategies has received less attention so far. In genetic settings, the latter corresponds to mutations in the DNA, whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals experimenting with new behaviors. Genetic mutations typically occur with very small probabilities, but random exploration of available strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this phenomenon "exploration dynamics" to contrast it with the traditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the emerging evolutionary dynamics, we consider a public goods game with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods games. This phenomenon is investigated through numerical simulations and analytical approximations. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| 关键词 | Cooperation Costly punishment Finite populations Mutation rates |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8873/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128911 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Traulsen A,Hauert C,De Silva H,et al. Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games.. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| Exploration%20dynami（429KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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