| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1514(199805/06)19:3<169::AID-OCA625>3.0.CO; 2-A |
| Optimal enforcement policies (crackdowns) on an illicit drug market. | |
| Kort PM; Feichtinger G; Hartl RF; Haunschmied JL | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Optimal Control Applications and Methods 19 (3): 169-184 |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper an optimal control model is presented to design enforcement programs minimizing the social costs from both the market and crackdown. The model is built around a dynamic equation proposed by Caulkins in which the development of the number of dealers in a particular illicit drug market depends on market sales and police enforcement. By using the maximum principle we show that, due to the positive feedback effect hypothesized by Kleiman, performing an enforcement policy that leads to a collapse of the drug market is more likely to be optimal when the sales volume depends on the number of dealers. In case of a buyers market, which means that the total of sales completely depends on the number of buyers, the optimal enforcement policy leads to a saddle-point equilibrium where the enforcement rate is fixed such that the number of dealers is kept constant at a positive level. |
| 主题 | World Population (POP) |
| 关键词 | Markets for illicit drugs Optimal control History-dependent equilibria Skiba point |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/5365/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/127722 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kort PM,Feichtinger G,Hartl RF,et al. Optimal enforcement policies (crackdowns) on an illicit drug market.. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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