| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment. |
| Chen X; Szolnoki A; Perc M
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| 发表日期 | 2014
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| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-14-024
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| 出版年 | 2014
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondo's paradox. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11244/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125989
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Chen X,Szolnoki A,Perc M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment.. 2014.
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文件名：
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IR-14-024.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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