| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| The Emergence of Altruistic Punishment: Via Freedom to Enforcement. | |
| Hauert C; Traulsen A; Brandt H; Nowak MA; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2007 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-07-053 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In human societies, cooperative behaviour in public goods interactions is usually enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on free-riders. Many experiments on public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are often willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves, effectively taking the law into their own hands. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of deviant behaviour are stable: once established, they prevent invasion by dissident minorities. But how can such costly punishing behaviour gain a foothold in the population? A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the public goods interaction, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behaviour based on the punishment of defectors. Thus the freedom to withdraw from the public enterprise leads to a self-enforcing prosocial norm. Paradoxically, the option of individual autarky may be an important step for the emergence of institutions punishing the non-cooperation of their members. Conversely, public goods interactions which are obligatory rather than voluntary are unlikely to gain a foothold in the population. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8405/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125571 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hauert C,Traulsen A,Brandt H,et al. The Emergence of Altruistic Punishment: Via Freedom to Enforcement.. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-07-053.pdf（176KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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