全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods
	Lionel Richefort
发表日期	2017
出处	Economic Theory
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be locally asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure. *** Suggested citation: Richefort, L., (2017), 'Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods', Nota di Lavoro 32.2017, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	C72;D64;H40
关键词	Multiple Public Goods Warm-glow Effects Bipartite Contribution Structure Nash Equilibrium Comparative Statics
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/warm-glow-giving-in-networks-with-multiple-public-goods-1/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118568
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lionel Richefort. Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods. 2017.

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文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
nota-di-lavoro.jpg（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
ndl2017-032.pdf（875KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览