全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies
	Joosung Lee
发表日期	2015
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular, then an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors: all the players always try to reach an agreement as soon as practicable and hence no strategic delay occurs. In any other network, however, an efficient equilibrium is impossible for sufficiently high discount factors because some players strategically delay an agreement. We also provide an example of a Braess-like paradox, in which the more links are available, the less links are actually used. Thus, network improvements may decrease social welfare. *** Suggested citation: Lee, J., (2015), 'Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies', Nota di Lavoro 53.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	C72;C78;D72;D74;D85
关键词	Noncooperative Bargaining Coalition Formation Communication Restriction Buyout Network Braess's Paradox
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/multilateral-bargaining-in-networks-on-the-prevalence-of-inefficiencies/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118418
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Joosung Lee. Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies. 2015.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2015691137271Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2015691137374NDL2015（1296KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览