| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation |
| Achim Hagen; Klaus Eisenack
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| 发表日期 | 2015
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2015
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total emission abatement are determined. We allow for multiple coalitions with multiple types of asymmetric countries. We then analyze the effect of multiple coalitions for the case of increasing marginal costs of abatement as well as for decreasing marginal benefits of abatement more generally. The results are sensitive to the assumptions on the benefits from abatement. For constant marginal benefits, the possibility of multiple agreements increases the number of cooperating countries and total abatement (compared to the standard case with a single agreement). For decreasing marginal benefits, total emissions are independent of the number of admitted agreements. The paper thus contributes to the emerging discussion on the scope and limits of climate clubs.
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Suggested citation: Hagen, A., Eisenack, K. (2015), 'International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation', Nota di Lavoro 58.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei |
| 特色分类 | Q54;C72
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| 关键词 | Multiple International Environmental Agreements
Coalition Formation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/international-environmental-agreements-with-asymmetric-countries-climate-clubs-vs-global-cooperation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118411
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Achim Hagen,Klaus Eisenack. International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation. 2015.
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