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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative | |
Andries Richter; Johan Grasman | |
发表日期 | 2013 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agents remain conditionally cooperative, unless other individuals are misbehaving already. We can observe a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst, which means that a transition from a cooperative social norm to non-cooperation occurs. Interestingly, in some parameter regions alternative stable states and limit cycles arise. The latter implies that the same community goes through such a transition repeatedly over long time spans – history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion of social capital. *** Suggested citation: Richter A., J. Grasman, (2013), 'The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative', Nota di Lavoro 80.2013, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. |
特色分类 | C73;D70;D64;Q20 |
关键词 | Common Pool Resource Conditional Cooperators Social-Ecological Complexity Social Capital Social Norms |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-transmission-of-sustainable-harvesting-norms-when-agents-are-conditionally-cooperative/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118210 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andries Richter,Johan Grasman. The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative. 2013. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
20139191559401Nota_d(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
20139191559534NDL201(1559KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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