G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries
Michael Hoel; Aart de Zeeuw
发表日期2013
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous.
特色分类F42;O32;Q2;C72
关键词Technology Agreement Coalition Stability Climate International Agreement
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/technology-agreements-with-heterogeneous-countries/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118144
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael Hoel,Aart de Zeeuw. Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries. 2013.
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