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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries | |
Michael Hoel; Aart de Zeeuw | |
发表日期 | 2013 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous. |
特色分类 | F42;O32;Q2;C72 |
关键词 | Technology Agreement Coalition Stability Climate International Agreement |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/technology-agreements-with-heterogeneous-countries/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118144 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Hoel,Aart de Zeeuw. Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
2013251431441Nota_di(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
2013251432244NDL2013(1505KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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