全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality
	Charles F. Mason; Andrew J. Plantinga
发表日期	2011
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem is centrally important in the use of carbon offsets as part of climate change mitigation. Analyzing optimal contracts for forest carbon sequestration, an important offset category, we conduct a national-scale simulation using results from an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 50 million acres, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are about $4 billion lower compared than under a uniform subsidy. *** Suggested citation: Charles F. Mason, Andrew J. Plantinga, The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 66, Issue 1, July 2013, Pages 1-14, ISSN 0095-0696, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2013.02.003
特色分类	Q2;D8;L15
关键词	Carbon Sequestration Incentive Contracting Offsets Additionality
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/contracting-for-impure-public-goods-carbon-offsets-and-additionality/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117952
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Charles F. Mason,Andrew J. Plantinga. Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2011291615191Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2011291616434NDL2011（401KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览