全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization
	Luca Di Corato
发表日期	2010
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment time trigger but only the feasible bargaining set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option value.
特色分类	C7;D8;K3;F2;O1
关键词	Real Options Nash Bargaining Expropriation Natural Resources Foreign Direct Investment
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/profit-sharing-under-the-threat-of-nationalization/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117797
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Luca Di Corato. Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2010231024351Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2010231024234NDL2010（670KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览