G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion
Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta; Thomas Rønde
发表日期2009
出处Economy and Society
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
特色分类L12;L40;L42
关键词Monopolization Practices Vertical Agreements
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/exclusive-dealing-the-interaction-between-foreclosure-and-investment-promotion/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117669
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chiara Fumagalli,Massimo Motta,Thomas Rønde. Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion. 2009.
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