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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion | |
Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta; Thomas Rønde | |
发表日期 | 2009 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. |
特色分类 | L12;L40;L42 |
关键词 | Monopolization Practices Vertical Agreements |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/exclusive-dealing-the-interaction-between-foreclosure-and-investment-promotion/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117669 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chiara Fumagalli,Massimo Motta,Thomas Rønde. Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
20091211162601Nota_d(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
2010171716524120-09.(473KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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