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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? | |
Michael Finus; Bianca Rundshagen and Johan Eyckmans | |
发表日期 | 2009 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm. |
特色分类 | C79;H87;Q54 |
关键词 | International Climate Agreements Sequential Coalition Formation Coordination through Moderator Integrated Assessment Model Algorithm for Computations |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/simulating-a-sequential-coalition-formation-process-for-the-climate-change-problem-first-come-but-second-served/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117659 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Bianca Rundshagen and Johan Eyckmans. Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
200912101850571Nota_(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
200912101851174109-0(365KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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