| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Environmental Options and Technological Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model | |
| Angelo Antoci; Simone Borghesi; Marcello Galeotti | |
| 发表日期 | 2009 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the effects on economic agents' behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in the region turns out to be below a given threshold level. On the other hand, it offers the firms that adopt an innovative, non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality is above the threshold level. The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics that arise with this financial mechanism from the interaction between the economic agents and the Public Administration in an evolutionary game context. |
| 特色分类 | C73;D62;G10;O30;Q28 |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/environmental-options-and-technological-innovation-an-evolutionary-game-model/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117640 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Angelo Antoci,Simone Borghesi,Marcello Galeotti. Environmental Options and Technological Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 200911191147521Nota_（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 2009111911483490-09.（364KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 200911191147521Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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