| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues | |
| Federico Echenique; Mehmet B. Yenmez | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty. |
| 特色分类 | C65,C78 |
| 关键词 | Matching markets,Core,Lattice,Gale-Shapley algorithm |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-solution-to-matching-with-preferences-over-colleagues/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117232 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Federico Echenique,Mehmet B. Yenmez. A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-120.pdf（598KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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