| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players | |
| Jean Christophe Pereau; Alejandro Caparrós; Tarik Tazdaït | |
| 发表日期 | 2005 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D74,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Strategic bargaining,Non-monolithic players,Scission,Noncooperative game-theory |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bargaining-with-non-monolithic-players/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/117207 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Christophe Pereau,Alejandro Caparrós,Tarik Tazdaït. Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2005-095.pdf（410KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
