| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats | |
| Matthieu Glachant | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are endogenous. The latter is the outcome of a rent-seeking contest between a green and a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in equilibrium and that it is more efficient than the pollution quota. We also discuss various VA design aspects. |
| 特色分类 | D72,Q28 |
| 关键词 | environmental policy,voluntary agreements,bargaining,legislatures,rent seeking,rent-seeking contests |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/voluntary-agreements-under-endogenous-legislative-threats/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116864 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthieu Glachant. Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats. 2003. |
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