| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring | |
| Laurent Franckx | |
| 发表日期 | 2002 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a,2002b) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information. |
| 特色分类 | K42,Q20 |
| 关键词 | environmental enforcement,ambient inspections,commitment |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/environmental-enforcement-with-endogenous-ambient-monitoring/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116800 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Franckx. Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2002-088.pdf（501KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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