全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities
	Sergio Currarini; Marco Marini
发表日期	2001
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2001
语种	英语
摘要	This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a "first mover advantage". We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is always nonempty when the game has strategic complementarities. We apply this result to cartel formation in Bertrand oligopoly and in Shapley-Shubik (1977) strategic market games.
特色分类	C7
关键词	Core,cooperative games,externalities
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-sequential-approach-to-the-characteristic-function-and-the-core-in-games-with-externalities/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116614
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Sergio Currarini,Marco Marini. A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities. 2001.