| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Markets and Cooperation |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
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| 发表日期 | 1999
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Why do money and markets crowd out co-operative relations? This paper characterises the effects of intertemporal preferences, money, and markets on players' ability to co-operate in material-payoff supergames. Players' aversion to intertemporal substitution facilitates co-operation by decreasing their evaluation of short-run gains from deviations and increasing that of losses from punishments. Goods' markets and money may hinder co-operation by allowing players to reallocate short-run gains from deviations in time, at some cost. Allowing for free intertemporal reallocation of payoffs, perfect financial markets always make co-operation harder. Financial markets' imperfections facilitate co-operation by opposing this effect. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D51,O17
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| 关键词 | Co-operation,repeated games,Prisoner's dilemma,commons,reciprocal exchange,implicit contracts,collusion,institutions
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/markets-and-cooperation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116492
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. Markets and Cooperation. 1999.
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文件名：
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NDL1999-100.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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