Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Research Brief |
规范类型 | 简报 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RB4519-1 |
来源ID | RB-4519-1 |
Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of Hospital Care | |
David Draper; William H. Rogers; Katherine L. Kahn; Emmett B. Keeler; Ellen R. Harrison; Marjorie J. Sherwood; Maureen F. Carney; Jacqueline Kosecoff; Harry Savitt; Harris Montgomery Allen; et al. | |
发表日期 | 2006-06-13 |
出版年 | 2006 |
页码 | 4 |
语种 | 英语 |
结论 | Key Findings
|
摘要 | Faced with sharply escalating Medicare costs in the early 1980s, the federal government completely revised the way Medicare pays hospitals for treating elderly patients. The governing agency, the Health Care Financing Administration, switched from a retrospective fee-for-service system to a prospective payment system (PPS). Under PPS, hospitals receive a fixed amount for treating patients diagnosed with a given illness, regardless of the length of stay or type of care received. |
主题 | Congestive Heart Failure ; Health Care Organization and Administration ; Health Care Quality ; Health Economics ; Health ; Health Care ; and Aging ; Medicare |
URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4519-1.html |
来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/109976 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Draper,William H. Rogers,Katherine L. Kahn,et al. Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of Hospital Care. 2006. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
research_briefs.gif(3KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
RAND_RB4519-1.pdf(140KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。