G2TT
来源类型Research Reports
规范类型报告
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7249/RR2101
ISBN9781977401298
来源IDRR-2101-OSD
A Wage Differential Approach to Managing Special and Incentive Pay
James Hosek; Michael G. Mattock; Beth J. Asch
发表日期2019
出版年2019
页码88
语种英语
结论
  • A number of special and incentive (S&I) pays (e.g., occupational pays and hazardous duty pays) already have features akin to a wage differential.
  • Incentives to select a longer military obligation contribute to the cost-effectiveness of S&I pays, and eliminating these incentives, as would be done under a wage differential, would decrease cost-effectiveness.
  • In the presence of risk aversion, it is cost-effective to compensate for uncertain circumstances such as hostile deployment and variation in supply-and-demand conditions by disbursing S&I pays when the circumstances are realized rather than on a continuous, scheduled basis, as would be done under a wage differential.
  • Even if it were desirable to convert such pays into a wage differential, the value to the servicemember in eliminating uncertainty in pay appears to be small.
摘要
  • In the presence of risk aversion, it is cost-effective to compensate for uncertain circumstances such as hostile deployment and variation in supply-and-demand conditions by disbursing special and incentive (S&I) pays when the circumstances are realized rather than on a continuous, scheduled basis, as would be done under a wage differential.
  • Incentives to select a longer military obligation contribute to the cost-effectiveness of S&I pays, and S&I pays with such incentives are more cost-effective and may be more beneficial than pays without them; eliminating these incentives, as would be done under a wage differential, would decrease cost-effectiveness.
  • With a wage differential, the value to the servicemember in eliminating uncertainty in pay appears to be small; there thus appears to be no real benefit to enacting a wage differential.
主题Military Compensation ; Military Personnel Retention ; United States Department of Defense
URLhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2101.html
来源智库RAND Corporation (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/108966
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James Hosek,Michael G. Mattock,Beth J. Asch. A Wage Differential Approach to Managing Special and Incentive Pay. 2019.
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