来源类型 | Research Reports
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规范类型 | 报告
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DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2101
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ISBN | 9781977401298
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来源ID | RR-2101-OSD
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| A Wage Differential Approach to Managing Special and Incentive Pay |
| James Hosek; Michael G. Mattock; Beth J. Asch
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发表日期 | 2019
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出版年 | 2019
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页码 | 88
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语种 | 英语
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结论 |
- A number of special and incentive (S&I) pays (e.g., occupational pays and hazardous duty pays) already have features akin to a wage differential.
- Incentives to select a longer military obligation contribute to the cost-effectiveness of S&I pays, and eliminating these incentives, as would be done under a wage differential, would decrease cost-effectiveness.
- In the presence of risk aversion, it is cost-effective to compensate for uncertain circumstances such as hostile deployment and variation in supply-and-demand conditions by disbursing S&I pays when the circumstances are realized rather than on a continuous, scheduled basis, as would be done under a wage differential.
- Even if it were desirable to convert such pays into a wage differential, the value to the servicemember in eliminating uncertainty in pay appears to be small.
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摘要 |
- In the presence of risk aversion, it is cost-effective to compensate for uncertain circumstances such as hostile deployment and variation in supply-and-demand conditions by disbursing special and incentive (S&I) pays when the circumstances are realized rather than on a continuous, scheduled basis, as would be done under a wage differential.
- Incentives to select a longer military obligation contribute to the cost-effectiveness of S&I pays, and S&I pays with such incentives are more cost-effective and may be more beneficial than pays without them; eliminating these incentives, as would be done under a wage differential, would decrease cost-effectiveness.
- With a wage differential, the value to the servicemember in eliminating uncertainty in pay appears to be small; there thus appears to be no real benefit to enacting a wage differential.
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主题 | Military Compensation
; Military Personnel Retention
; United States Department of Defense
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URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2101.html
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来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States)
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引用统计 |
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资源类型 | 智库出版物
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条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/108966
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推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 |
James Hosek,Michael G. Mattock,Beth J. Asch. A Wage Differential Approach to Managing Special and Incentive Pay. 2019.
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