来源类型 | Research Reports
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规范类型 | 报告
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DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1475-1
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ISBN | 9780833095978
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来源ID | RR-1475-1-UIA
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| Security Sector Reform in Ukraine |
| Olga Oliker; Lynn E. Davis; Keith Crane; Andrew Radin; Celeste Gventer; Susanne Sondergaard; James T. Quinlivan; Stephan B. Seabrook; Jacopo Bellasio; Bryan Frederick; et al.
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发表日期 | 2016
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出版年 | 2016
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页码 | 136
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语种 | 英语
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结论 |
Roles and Responsibilities Are Unclear- The roles and responsibilities of the President and Cabinet of Ministers are ambiguous and relationships with the Cabinet of Ministers are unwieldy.
- There are gaps and overlaps in the functions performed by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
- Civilian control remains weak below the President and Cabinet of Ministers. Regulations and organizational culture tend to push routine decisions upward to at least the Deputy Minister level, contributing to a culture of avoiding responsibility.
Coordination Is Lacking Across the Sector- In Ukraine, ministries and agencies operate independently, with little accountability and coordination. They have their own resources, make their own decisions, and set their own tasks.
- Sharing of information is inconsistent. Individual ministries or agencies fail to specialize and instead invest in broad ranges of capabilities.
- Decisionmaking is often taken to the highest levels, overwhelming senior officials.
- Organizations designed to coordinate ministries and agencies are weak or ineffective.
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摘要 |
- Define responsibilities and authorities of the security-sector leadership. The President should have responsibility for the defense of Ukraine against threats to its sovereignty and independence. Presidential responsibilities extend to the command and control of military operations and to policy control over the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. The Minister of Defense should be the senior official charged with making and carrying out the Ukrainian government's policy on defense; the chain of command should run from the President to the Minister of Defense, to the Chief of Defense Force, to the Joint Operational Command.
- Improve coordination across the government by expanding the responsibilities of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to include implementation of the President's decisions, expanding of the role of the Joint Committee on Intelligence, creating a new cybersecurity and defense structure under a Joint Committee on Cyber Security, and creating a committee to coordinate foreign defense assistance.
- Reduce the size of the Security Service of Ukraine and clarify and narrow its authorities as a domestic intelligence organization, while retaining its responsibility for some law enforcement activities in coordination with other agencies.
- Empower the Minister of Defense as senior civilian adviser to the President, Prime Minister, and Ukraine's parliament on defense policies; reorganize the Ministry of Defense into new departments aligned with roles to avoid the inefficiencies, establish the Chief of the Defense Forces as primary military adviser to the Minister and the President; and create a Joint Operational Command to centralize responsibilities for ongoing military operations.
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主题 | Critical Infrastructure Protection
; Cyber Warfare
; Cybersecurity
; Military Doctrine
; Politics and Government
; Security Cooperation
; Ukraine
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URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1475-1.html
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来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States)
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引用统计 |
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资源类型 | 智库出版物
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条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/108434
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推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 |
Olga Oliker,Lynn E. Davis,Keith Crane,et al. Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. 2016.
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