| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22457 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22457 |
| Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions | |
| T. Renee Bowen; Ying Chen; Hülya K. Eraslan; Jan Zápal | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. An endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs can provide this flexibility in increasingly complex environments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22457 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580131 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | T. Renee Bowen,Ying Chen,Hülya K. Eraslan,et al. Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22457.pdf（562KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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