G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22408
来源IDWorking Paper 22408
Optimal Tax Administration
Michael Keen; Joel Slemrod
发表日期2016-07-18
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. At its heart is a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22408
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580082
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael Keen,Joel Slemrod. Optimal Tax Administration. 2016.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w22408.pdf(424KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Michael Keen]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Michael Keen]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Michael Keen]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w22408.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。